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ABSTRACT 
 
Using data on the US and EU top R&D spenders from 2004 until 2012, this paper investigates the 
sources of the US/EU productivity gap. We find robust evidence that US firms have a higher capacity 
to translate R&D into productivity gains (especially in the high-tech macro sector), and this 
contributes to explaining the higher productivity of US firms. Conversely, EU firms are more likely 
to achieve productivity gains through capital-embodied technological change, at least in the medium- 
and low-tech macro sectors. Our results also show that the US/EU productivity gap has worsened 
during the crisis period, as the EU companies have been more affected by the economic crisis in their 
capacity to translate R&D investments into productivity. Based on these findings, we make a case for 
a learning-based and selective R&D funding, which, instead of purely aiming at stimulating higher 
R&D expenditures, works on improving the firms’ capabilities to transform R&D into productivity 
gains. 
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1. Introduction 
 
While productivity trends were broadly stable between the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, both 
in Europe and the US, we can observe a substantial change since the second half of the 1990s. In 
particular, during the last two decades, there has been a widening productivity gap between European 
countries and the United States that has now reached considerable size. In addition, as a consequence 
of the great recession that followed the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, productivity has been curbed 
more obviously in Europe than in the US (OECD, 2015a, 2016 and 2017, see Fig.1). Indeed, OECD 
macroeconomic data (OECD, 2015b) report that in 2014 the labor productivity (measured as GDP 
per hour worked) in EU-28 was $ (2010 PPP) 46.6, meanwhile it was $ (2010 PPP) 63 in the US (see 
Fig.1).  
 As shown by Broadberry and O’Mahony (2004) and van Ark et al. (2008), the source of this 
widening gap has been a slowdown in the European productivity growth, implying that the post-
WW2 European catch-up process has not only stopped but is actually now reversing. Even for the 
latest figures, this gap appears to be widening. The OECD data report an annual productivity growth 
rate (2014 vs. 2013) of 0.5% for the US as compared to 0.3% for the European Union (OECD, 2015b).  
There is little consensus on causes of these trends, which is also due to the fact that most analyses 
refer to aggregate data. The literature has pointed out to different possible reasons probably jointly 
contributing to the widening gap, ranging from the different level of flexibility in labor markets 
(Gomez-Salvador et al., 2006; Grimalda, 2016), the quality of human capital (Gu et al., 2002) or 
better North-American managerial practices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010; Bloom et al., 2012). 
However, the main strand of the literature drew attention to the role of the differentials in the 
introduction and diffusion of new technologies between the two sides of the Atlantic (Oliner and 
Sichel, 2000; Daveri, 2002; Wilson, 2009; Bacchiocchi and Montobbio, 2010) 1. In particular, there 
is a well-documented gap in the relative level of R&D spending, which may have played an important 
role in explaining the productivity gap (Rogers, 2010). Considering the EU-28, the BERD/GDP2 ratio 
was 1.11% in 2002. It has remained almost constant until 2008 (1.14%), while slightly increasing in 
the following years up to 1.24% in 2012. Meanwhile, the US R&D intensity was 1.77% in 2002, 
                                                 
1 Andrews et al. (2015) underline how productivity growth of the globally most productive firms has remained robust in 
the 21st century, despite the slowdown in aggregate productivity. At the same time, the rising productivity gap between 
the global frontier and other firms raises key questions about why seemingly non-rival technologies do not diffuse to all 
firms. Their analysis reveals a highly uneven process of technological diffusion consistent with a model where global 
frontier technologies diffuse to laggards once they are adapted to country-specific circumstances by the most productive 
firms within each country (i.e. national frontier firms). This interpretation may also help to understand the persistent 
productivity gap between Europe and the US. 
2 BERD = Business Enterprise Expenditure on R&D. 
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reached 1.97% in 2008, slowed down in the following years to get back to 1.95% in 2012 (the latest 
available value, OECD, 2014).  
On the one hand, some scholars have argued that the lower European R&D spending is mainly 
due to differences between industries (the so-called structural composition effect) and have provided 
evidence supporting their thesis. This structural composition effect arises because the R&D-intensive 
manufacturing and R&D-intensive service industries are under-represented in the European economy 
in comparison to the US (European Commission, 2007; Mathieu and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 
2008; Lindmark et al., 2010; Ortega-Argilés and Brandsma, 2010). This view therefore treats the 
differences in R&D spending rather as an artifact of differences in industry composition.  
On the other hand, other authors have stressed the so-called intrinsic effect and they have also 
provided convincing empirical evidence in support of their view. These authors pointed out that a 
general difficulty of European firms in investing in R&D and in achieving productivity gains can be 
detected. According to this view, EU firms within each industry are characterized by a lower R&D 
intensity in comparison with their US counterparts (Erken and van Es, 2007; Ortega-Argilés et al., 
2010, 2011). In addition, Ortega-Argilés et al. (2014) argue that there is also a lower capacity to 
translate R&D investment into productivity gains. In a sense, European companies might be still 
affected by a sort of modern Solow’s (1987) paradox, i.e. by a difficulty to translate their own 
investments in R&D into increases in productivity. In summary, there could be an issue both in the 
level and in the productivity impact of R&D spending within European firms, irrespective of their 
industry belonging.  
However, much of the scientific and policy discussion seems to be focused on the level effect. 
European policy makers were very explicit that it is necessary to augment R&D investments to foster 
productivity and, therefore, to support the recovery of growth and jobs in a ‘knowledge-based’ 
economy (European Commission 2010a and 2010b). However, precisely knowing the mechanisms 
sustaining the productivity gap is crucial for policy-making. In particular, if there are differential 
abilities to translate R&D into productivity gains, the lower levels of R&D spending may be a rational 
response by the firms, because their expected pay-off is lower. This may imply that policies aiming 
purely at increasing R&D spending (namely, the EU 3% target in the R&D/GDP ratio is a prime 
example) may be not enough if policies are not simultaneously aiming at increasing the capabilities 
to make efficient use of R&D inputs.  
Accounting for the role of these different explanations for the EU-US productivity gap 
requires the ability to control for industry composition in Europe and the US, as well as for R&D and 
productivity at the level of the firm. Most existing analyses of the European-US productivity gap 
have, however, made reference to aggregate data. We therefore propose an empirical analysis based 
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on a unique longitudinal database comprising comparable samples of European and US companies 
for a total of 1,112 top-R&D performing firms. Together with comparisons for the overall sample of 
firms, we will also split our analysis by two macro sectors (high-tech and medium- and low-tech), in 
order to better investigate the nature and source of the transatlantic productivity gap, with particular 
reference to the respective roles of the structural and the intrinsic effect. Moreover, the time-period 
available (2004-2012) also allows us to investigate the R&D-productivity dynamics before and after 
the recent worldwide economic crisis. Thus, our paper also sheds light on a particular critical period 
of the economic development in Europe, which has not been investigated by earlier studies.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the extant literature on the 
subject and states the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 outlines how the dataset was constructed and 
presents the empirical methodology used to pursue the analysis. Section 4 discusses results, while the 
final section concludes and puts forward some policy implications. 
 
 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
 
Back in 1979, Zvi Griliches started a prosperous empirical literature devoted to investigate the 
relationship between R&D and productivity (for a comprehensive survey, see Mohnen and Hall, 
2013; for a very recent synthesis, based on a meta-regression analysis, of the available evidence on 
the subject, see Ugur et al., 2016). Overall, this micro-econometric literature has provided robust 
evidence of a positive and significant impact of R&D on productivity at the firm level, with an 
elasticity ranging from 0.05 to 0.253. Indeed, the consensus about the existence of a positive and 
significant impact of R&D on productivity remains strong across almost all studies and 
methodologies, even if comparable data in more countries are not common and results might be 
subject to discussion (Sterlacchini, 1989; Hall and Mairesse, 1995; Klette and Kortum, 2004; Loof 
and Heshmati, 2006; Heshmati and Kim, 2011; Ortega-Argiles et al., 2011; Kumbhakar et al., 2012; 
Gkypali et al., 2015).  
This leads to our first baseline hypothesis: 
 
H1. R&D stocks positively affect firm productivity. 
                                                 
3 As far as we know, the extant literature (see the discussion below, also quoting the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients) found R&D/productivity elasticities within these boundaries. However, we cannot exclude different results 
from studies external to our knowledge. 
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However, when considering the structural dimension of an economic system, its industrial 
composition might affect the overall aggregate outcome since technological opportunities and 
appropriability conditions are very different across industries (see Freeman, 1982; Winter, 1984; 
Malerba, 2004). This may also involve substantial differences in the industry-specific R&D-
productivity links. 
In particular, previous literature suggests that more complex and radical product innovation 
generally relies on formal R&D, while process innovation is much more related to embodied technical 
change achieved by investment in new machinery and equipment (Parisi et al., 2006; Conte and 
Vivarelli 2014). Within this interpretative framework, an interesting result from Ortega-Argilés et al. 
(2014 and 2015) is that in traditional low-tech industries, which focus on process innovation, 
productivity gains turn out to be more related to capital accumulation rather than to R&D 
expenditures. Consistently, Montresor and Vezzani (2015), using firm-level data of top world R&D 
investors over the 2002-2010 time-span and adopting quantile regressions, show that the return of 
knowledge capital (based on R&D) is the largest in the high-tech industries. They also show how in 
the non-high-tech industries physical capital is the pivotal factor. 
Indeed, previous studies at the industry level (mainly on manufacturing industries) clearly 
suggest a greater impact of R&D investment on productivity in the high-tech industries rather than in 
the low-tech ones.  Griliches and Mairesse (1982) and Cuneo and Mairesse (1983), who performed 
two companion studies on French and US firms, found that the impact of R&D on productivity for 
scientific firms (elasticity equal to 0.20) was significantly greater than for non-scientific firms (0.10). 
By the same token, Verspagen (1995) carried out a multi-country study involving 9 countries, singling 
out three macro sectors: high-tech, medium-tech and low-tech, according to the OECD classification 
(Hatzichronoglou, 1997). The major finding of his study was that the impact of R&D was significant 
and positive only in the high-tech macro sector. Los and Verspagen (2000) found (for a sample of US 
manufacturing firms) that the average elasticity of the R&D investment to company productivity was 
0.014; however, when they run the same analysis for the high-tech industries only, the elasticity 
increased to 0.1. Consistently, Wakelin (2001), using data on 170 UK quoted firms during the period 
1988-1992, found a significant impact of R&D on productivity growth, with firms belonging to 
industries defined as ‘net users of innovations’ turning out to experience a higher impact. 
A more recent study by Ortega-Argilés et al. (2010), looking at the top 577 EU R&D investors, 
concluded that the coefficient of this impact increases monotonically when moving from the low-tech 
over the medium-high to the high-tech industries, ranging from a minimum of 0.03/0.05 to a 
maximum of 0.14/0.17. Consistent with these latter results and using data from OECD countries, 
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Kancs and Siliverstovs (2016) showed that R&D increases firm productivity with an average 
elasticity of 0.15, ranging from -0.02 to 0.33 according to the different levels of firms’ R&D 
intensity4. 
 
This discussion leads to the following hypotheses:  
 
H2a. The elasticity of productivity to the R&D stock is higher in high-tech firms than in 
medium-low tech firms. 
 
Conversely, 
 
H2b. The elasticity of productivity to the physical capital stock is higher in low and medium-
tech firms than in high-tech firms. 
 
Moving closer to the main topic investigated in this study, Ortega-Argilés et al. (2014 and 
2015) analyze the transatlantic productivity gap providing evidence of differences among industries. 
Relying on the COMPUSTAT database covering the period 1990-2008, and comprising 1,809 US 
and EU companies for a total of 16,079 observations, robust evidence of a significant impact of R&D 
on productivity is provided. Moreover, the R&D coefficients for the US firms always turn out to be 
significantly higher. To see to what extent these transatlantic differences in the R&D-productivity 
relationship may be related to the different industrial structures in the US and the EU, the analysis is 
differentiated by industries. The result is that both in manufacturing, services and high-tech 
manufacturing industries US firms are more able to translate their R&D investments into productivity 
increases.  
However, albeit providing very interesting results, previous works seem to lack a 
comprehensive interpretation of what has been found at the empirical level. Indeed, the revealed 
transatlantic gap in the R&D/productivity elasticity is actually consistent with three interpretations.  
Firstly, the possibility of “threshold” effects in the effectiveness of R&D investment may 
suggest that large R&D expenditures are necessary to get the best in terms of productivity gains. This 
means that the average lower level of knowledge stock in the EU firms relative to US firms can be 
seen as one of the culprits of the revealed weaker impact of R&D on productivity levels in Europe.  
                                                 
4 Cincera and Ravet (2014), pursuing a slightly different research objective, assess the impact of both geographic and 
industrial diversification of economic activities on the performance of European multinational enterprises investing in 
R&D. Their results indicate a positive impact from globalisation on firms’ R&D productivity, especially in the US, while 
a negative impact for industrial diversification is found. 
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Secondly, if (as hypothesized above) R&D investments have a higher effect on productivity 
in the high-tech industries rather than in the medium- and low-tech ones, the structural composition 
effect discussed above may play a key role. In other words, the US advantage in terms of R&D impact 
may be mainly due to an industry composition effect: in the aggregate, US firms may exhibit higher 
R&D/productivity elasticities just because they are relatively more concentrated in the high-tech 
industries where the returns to R&D have revealed to be higher.  
Thirdly, the transatlantic productivity gap can be seen as suggestive of the presence of a 
relevant intrinsic effect, that is an intrinsic difficulty of European firms (compared with their US 
counterparts) in translating R&D investment into productivity gains even within each industry, 
including the high-tech ones.  While data limitations prevent us from directly investigating the 
possible explanations of the insurgence of a significant intrinsic effect in this study, from a theoretical 
perspective the extant literature suggests at least two interpretative frameworks. On the one hand, a 
vast literature focuses on the superadditive effects that emerge when R&D investments are combined 
with an adequate endowment in human capital and with appropriate HRM (Human Resource 
Management) practices (see Acemoglu, D. 1998; Goldin and Katz, 1998; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt, 2002; Laursen and Foss, 2003; Shipton et al., 2006; Añón Higón, Gómez and Vargas, 2017; 
Hendarman and Cantner, 2018)5. In this view, European companies, which are characterized on 
average by a lower level of human capital, might register a systematic disadvantage in exploiting 
those complementarities that can make the R&D investment more effective in fostering productivity 
growth. On the other hand, a well-established strand of literature has pointed out how organizational 
settings and strategic managerial practices are crucial in affecting productivity trends and 
significantly vary across countries, with a revealed comparative advantage of US companies (see 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Black and Lynch, 2001; Guthrie, 2001; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010; 
Bloom et al., 2012; Amoroso, 2017). If such is the case, the transatlantic managerial gap may well 
affect the ability of translating the R&D efforts into productivity gains. 
 
These considerations lead to our third (key) hypothesis:   
 
H3. The elasticity of productivity to R&D stock is higher in US firms relative to EU firms; 
moreover, this gap is obvious within different macro sectors, as well6. 
 
                                                 
5 Indeed, some studies even show that a proper endowment in skills is a sort of pre-condition for a larger and more 
effective investment in R&D (see Leiponen, 2005; Piva and Vivarelli, 2009). 
6 Taking into account the nature of the available longitudinal data (see Section 3), lack of observations prevented has from 
testing the intrinsic effect at the single-industry level, while we did it at a more aggregate level of analysis (macro sectors). 
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Taking into account the extant micro-econometric literature focusing on the relationship 
between R&D and productivity and the theoretical perspectives discussed above, our empirical study 
tests the hypotheses listed above using updated microdata and also analyzing a critical time span 
including pre- and post- world crisis sub-periods. In fact, although both the European and the US-
economy have been severely plagued by the economic crisis, large parts of the European economy 
have found it harder to recover. Thus, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the crisis might 
have enforced (or even amplified) the factors contributing to widening the productivity gap, rather 
than closing it. Moreover, the transatlantic gaps in terms of human capital and managerial practices 
(see above) have not shown any tendency to shrink in recent times.  
 
This leads to our last hypothesis: 
 
H4. The elasticity of productivity to R&D stock is higher in US firms relative to EU firms, 
both before and after the major financial and economic crisis occurred in the years 2008/09.  
 
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1 The data 
 
Previous literature has been partly limited by the extreme difficulty to obtain reliable and 
comparable micro datasets across countries. The microdata used in this study were provided by the 
JRC–IPTS (Joint Research Centre-Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, Seville) of the 
European Commission7. The dataset is mainly based on the EU Industrial R&D Scoreboard and 
aggregates information on top R&D spenders worldwide from 2004 until 2012. In particular, the EU 
Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard provides the main economic and financial data of the top 
corporate R&D investors from the EU and from abroad. It uses data extracted directly from each 
company’s Annual Report and consolidated at group level, i.e. including all the subsidiaries. It is 
worth highlighting that a key feature of our data is the availability of using such consolidated 
information, which allows us to account for the global structure of the company’s locations of 
production and R&D. Indeed, we are able to compare the effect of overall investments in R&D on a 
                                                 
7 This longitudinal dataset has been prepared and analyzed in the context of a project on ‘European Innovative Companies 
and Global Value Chains: The Productivity Impact of Heterogeneous Strategies’ funded by the JRC-IPTS (European 
Commission). 
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firm productivity, regardless of where they are located in the world (see Castellani et al., 2017)8. 
Additional balance sheet information from the Bureau Van Dijk’s ORBIS database for the same 
period was merged. These data refer to firm sales, employment and capital expenditures.   
An important limitation of the used data is that they are biased in favor of large firms (the 
median size being 4,683 3mployees), while innovative SMEs (small and medium enterprises) are 
under-represented. However, even if the population of innovative companies is not covered 
completely, it is important to underline that the companies listed in Scoreboard account for more than 
90% of worldwide Business Enterprise Expenditure on R&D (BERD)9.  
Overall, the EU Industrial R&D Scoreboard organized as a panel of over 2,000 companies 
worldwide over the years 2004-2012; in this paper we focus on EU and US firms only. The final 
sample is unbalanced in nature and comprises 1,355 companies (732 European firms and 623 US 
firms) with data from a minimum of 2 years, to a maximum of 9 years. Moreover, outlier observations 
have been dropped following the Grubbs test (as discussed in Section 3.2) and leading to a final 
sample of 1,112 companies (504 European firms and 608 US firms) and 8,763 observations. 
Table 1 reports the distribution of the retained firms and observations across countries, 
showing a dominant role of Germany and United Kingdom in Europe, but letting the other major 
European countries to be adequately represented in the sample10. 
 
 
<INSERT TABLE 1> 
 
 
 Table 2 reports the distribution of the investigated firms (and resulting observations) across 
industries (ICB code11) both for the whole sample and separately for the EU and the US.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 2>  
 
                                                 
8 In other words, our data take into account the overall global value chain within a given company, including labor 
outsourcing. From this respect, the investigated link between R&D stock and labor productivity is tested at the global 
corporate level, under the hypothesis that a US type of corporate governance may positively affect this link (see H3). 
9 Innovative SMEs are only marginally covered by this study not only because of sample selection in size, but also because 
some SMEs (especially in the low-tech industries) may be innovative without necessarily being R&D-intensive (see 
Becker and Pain, 2008; Ortega-Argilés,Vivarelli and Voigt, 2009; Link, 2017, Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 2017). 
10 Obviously enough, R&D and innovation activities are heterogeneously distributed across EU countries and regions (see 
Maurseth and Verspagen, 2002); however, investigating the differences in the innovative efforts within the EU is out of 
the scope of the present study. 
11 The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is a definitive system categorizing over 70,000 companies and 75,000 
securities worldwide, enabling the comparison of companies across four levels of classification and national boundaries. 
The ICB system is supported by the ICB Database, an unrivalled data source for global industry-level analyses, which is 
maintained by FTSE International Limited (http://www.icbenchmark.com/). 
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3.2 Econometric specification and descriptive statistics 
 
Following a consolidated tradition (e.g. Hall and Mairesse, 1995, pp. 268-69), we test an 
augmented production function, derived from a standard Cobb-Douglas in three inputs: knowledge 
capital, physical capital and labor (see also Verspagen, 1995; Ortega-Argilés et al., 2014 and 2015). 
For comparison with most extant literature on the topic (see Section 2), we express the production 
function in per worker terms: 
 
(1) ln (
𝑁𝑆
𝐸
)
𝑖,𝑡
=  𝛼 + 𝛽 ln (
𝐾
𝐸
)
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛾 ln (
𝐶
𝐸
)
𝑖,𝑡
+ ϑln (𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
with i = 1,…, 1,112;    t = 2004,…, 2012;   ln = natural logarithm. 
 
While our ideal proxy for labor productivity should be expressed as value added over total 
Employment (E), in our dataset we found that the value-added variable had a very high number of 
missing values, due to the particular accounting procedures adopted in the US. In order to maintain a 
reasonable number of observations, we decided to use Net Sales (NS) instead of Value Added to 
construct the productivity variable. However, over the 3,866 observations for which both Value 
Added and Net Sales are available, the pairwise correlation coefficient between the two turns out to 
be 0.88. This high correlation makes us confident in using Net Sales/Employment as a proper proxy 
for labor productivity. 
Turning our attention to the regressors, our pivotal impact variables are the R&D stock (K, 
for knowledge) per employee and the physical capital stock (C) per employee12. Taking per capita 
values permits both standardization of our data and elimination of possible company’s size effects 
(see, for example, Crépon et al., 1998, p.123). In this framework, total employment (E) is a control 
variable that indicates increasing returns if  turns out to be greater than zero and decreasing returns 
otherwise.  
In particular, K/E (R&D stock per employee) captures that portion of technological change 
which is related to the cumulated R&D investments, while C/E (physical capital stock per employee) 
is the result of the accumulated investment, implementing different vintages of technologies. So, this 
                                                 
12 All the monetary variables are expressed in Euro after applying appropriate exchange rates for companies based in non-
Euro countries (i.e. Denmark, Hungary, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States) and in cases of firms whose financial 
data where expressed in pounds or dollars even if located in the Euro-area. 
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variable encompasses the so-called embodied technological change, possibly affecting productivity 
growth. 
Given the crucial role assumed by the R&D variable in this study, it is worthwhile to discuss 
in detail what is intended by R&D in our database, since R&D measurement might follow different 
accounting practices in different countries over the world. In particular, the R&D investment included 
in the Scoreboard is the cash investment which is funded by the companies themselves, while it 
excludes R&D undertaken under contract for customers such as governments or other companies. 
Therefore, our R&D indicator is consistent and homogeneous across all the considered countries and 
refers to the genuine flow of current additional knowledge resources. 
As it is common in the literature (see Hulten, 1990; Jorgenson, 1990; Hall and Mairesse, 1995; 
Parisi et al., 2006), stock indicators rather than flows are considered as independent variables. Indeed, 
productivity is affected by the accumulated stocks of R&D and physical capital and not only by 
current or lagged flows.  
Moreover, dealing with stocks, rather than flows, has two additional advantages: on the one 
hand, since stocks incorporate the accumulated investments in the past, the risk of endogeneity is 
lower. On the other hand, this allows avoiding the complex (sometimes arbitrary) choice of the 
appropriate lag structure for the flows. 
In our paper, R&D stock (K) is computed using a standard perpetual inventory method (PIM) 
approach according to the following formula13: 
 
(2)   Kt =
Kt−1
(1+δ)
+ R&𝐷t 
 
Where R&D = R&D expenditures;    δ = depreciation rate (0.15)  
 
The physical capital stock (C) was instead directly provided in the dataset, as a public 
information from balance sheets14. 
In order to eliminate outliers, we undertook an outlier detection procedure using the Grubbs (1969) 
test over NS/E, K/E and C/E. After the outlier detection process, 243 companies were dropped. More 
in detail, 138 observations for the NS/E variable, 313 for the K/E variable and 294 observations for 
                                                 
13 In year 0, 𝐾0 =
𝑅&𝐷0
(𝑔+𝛿)
 (where g is computed as the average growth rate of the corresponding flow variable in the first 
three years available and δ is the depreciation rate). 
14 We also computed the physical capital stock starting from the investment flows using the same PIM procedure adopted 
in the case of the R&D stock. Nevertheless, due to a large number of missing values, we opted for the already available 
capital stock variable. Overall, the pairwise correlation coefficient between the physical capital stock from balance sheets 
and the physical capital stock computed with the PIM is 0.72 (over the available 7,056 observations), which supports our 
choice. 
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the C/E variable were deleted. The final dataset permits to retain almost the 75% of overall European 
and US R&D covered by the Scoreboard in 2012. This value represents almost the 65% of total 
European and US Business Enterprise Expenditure on R&D (BERD). 
Specification (1) was estimated through different econometric techniques. First, we ran pooled 
ordinary least squared (POLS) regressions, augmented with a complete set of country (17 European 
countries + US), time (9 years), industry (34 ICB codes) dummies and controlling for 
heteroskedasticity (using the Eicker/Huber/White sandwich estimator to compute robust standard 
errors). While potentially biased by omitted firm-level characteristics simultaneously correlated with 
R&D stocks and firm productivity, POLS regressions offer a useful baseline.  
Second, to take into account firm specific unobservable time-invariant characteristics, we ran 
fixed effect (FE) regressions15. On the one hand, FE regressions offer the great advantage of allowing 
to control for both unobserved heterogeneity and the intra-firm dependence structure, which 
significantly reduce a potential bias in the R&D coefficient. On the other hand, the effect of time 
invariant variables (in our case country and industry dummies) are not individually identified any 
more, since they are encompassed by the individual firm-level fixed effects16.  
Table 3 reports the means and standard deviations of the four relevant variables in 
specification (1). As we are also interested in singling out industry differences in the 
R&D/productivity relationship, we split our panel into two macro sectors: high-tech vs medium- and 
low-tech, ranking industries according to their R&D intensity (measured in terms of 
R&D/employment, see Ortega-Argilés et al., 2011)17. Furthermore, we also consider the descriptive 
statistics in the pre- and post-world crisis sub-periods. 
                                                 
15 Random effect (RE) regressions were also run and tested against the FE specification through the Hausman test. 
According to the outcomes of the test, in all the following investigated cases the FE estimates turned out to be preferable 
to the RE ones (results available from the authors upon request). It needs to be recognized that while firm fixed effects 
capture a large number of potential confounders, there can certainly be time-varying firm characteristics that are 
potentially correlated with both R&D capital stock and firm productivity. This can potentially bias the results in an 
unknown way, but data limitation prevents us to do any better than we do. In our defense, we submit that our specification 
mimics previous studies, and this makes our work more closely comparable with them. 
16It is worth mentioning that several alternative estimators of productivity equations and of the role of R&D in affecting 
productivity (often considered and measured differently from what done in our paper) have been proposed; see, for 
instance, Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003;  Wooldridge, 2009; De Loecker, 2011; Doraszelski and 
Jaumandreu, 2013 and Ackerberg et al., 2015. Although these estimators aim to solve the problem of unobserved 
heterogeneity shocks, they make strong underlying assumptions about firm behavior, which have led some authors to 
conclude that the offered seemingly elegant solution to the problem is illusionary (see Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). As 
shown in Schubert and Neuhäusler (2018), in many real applications structural TFP estimators perform poorly, for 
example leading to inflated or deflated elasticities of the physical capital stock. Furthermore, existing studies often reveal 
that different estimators yield highly correlated TFP measures, thus making the choice of the estimation method less 
relevant (see Van Bieseboreck, 2007 and 2008; Castellani and Giovannetti, 2010; Van Beveren, 2012). All these things 
considered, in this paper we decided to prefer simplicity and to avoid potentially questionable assumptions, so opting for 
POLS and individual fixed effects. Moreover, in so doing our results can be compared to earlier econometric works (see 
the literature discussed in Section 2), which typically relied on POLS or FE estimates of labor productivity. 
17 As already mentioned (see footnote 6), paucity of observations has prevented us from using a more disaggregated 
industrial splitting. Moreover, missing values in the value added variable (see above) prevented us from using the 
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< INSERT TABLE 3 > 
 
As it can be seen, our sample mainly comprises very large and established corporations, with 
an average employment of more than 20,000 employees (the median value is 4,683). On average, US 
companies are characterized by a larger R&D stock per employees as compared to EU companies 
(+60%). Moreover, US companies are more productive (NS/E) than EU firms, although being smaller 
on average. This very preliminary evidence is consistent both with a view that relates the transatlantic 
productivity gap to differences in the level of R&D investments and one which emphasizes the 
different impact of R&D investments. The econometric analysis (see next section) will allow us to 
properly investigate this issue. 
Considering the sectoral taxonomy, average values suggest that the productivity per 
employees decreases when shifting from the high-tech macro sector to the medium- and low-tech 
macro sector (together with the R&D stock per employee, not surprisingly), meanwhile the physical 
capital per employee increases, suggesting a larger endowment of embodied technologies in the 
medium- and low-tech industries.  
Turning our attention to the pre- and post-crisis subsamples, the statistical evidence suggests 
that the US/EU divides in both productivity and R&D stock have persisted after the crisis.  
 
 
 
 
4. Econometric results 
 
Table 4 provides the baseline econometric results concerning the whole sample of 1,112 
companies (8,763 observations).  
 
< INSERT TABLE 4 > 
                                                 
R&D/VA ratio as an indicator of R&D intensity, as common in the literature; hence we opted for the R&D/employment 
ratio (we chose employment as a measure of size instead of net sales since the former is more stable over time and less 
dependent on the firm’s location in the supply chain). The industry R&D intensities and the resulting split into the high-
tech vs the medium- and low-tech macro sectors are reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix. We chose R&D/E=9.5 as a 
reasonable threshold both to be consistent with the OECD classification (see Hatzichronoglou, 1997) and to keep an 
adequate number of companies (409) and observations (3,180) in the medium- and low-tech macro sector. The resulting 
high-tech macro sector is made by: Aerospace & defense, Automobiles & parts, Chemicals Electronic & electrical 
equipment, Health care equipment & services, Leisure goods, Pharmaceuticals & biotechnology,  Software & computer 
services, Technology hardware & equipment.  
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In line with H1 and with the extensive literature recalled in Section 2, we find robust evidence 
of a positive and significant impact of the R&D stock on productivity with an elasticity ranging from 
0.148 to 0.178, according to the different adopted estimation techniques (POLS vs. FE). These 
estimates are within the bounds set by previous empirical studies (0.05/0.25; see Section 2). As far as 
the physical capital stock is concerned, we assess a positive and significant impact ranging from 0.112 
(FE) to 0.236 (POLS). Capital formation, embodying vintages of new technologies, emerges as a still 
important driver of productivity growth. 
The following Tables 5 and 6 split the analysis into the high- and the medium- and low-tech 
macro sectors. 
 
< INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6> 
 
 
Consistently with H2a, in Table 5 and 6 we find that R&D has a larger effect on productivity 
in the high-tech rather than in the medium- and low-tech macro sector (0.255 vs 0.100 in the FE 
estimates). Instead, as per H2b, the effect of the physical capital stock is larger in the latter group 
(0.195 vs 0.082 in the FE estimates).  These results support the view that productivity gains can be 
originated by different types of innovation, with more complex and radical product innovation (more 
common in the high-tech companies) generally relying on formal R&D, while process innovation 
(more common in the medium- and low-tech firms) more related to embodied technical change 
achieved by investment in new machinery and equipment. 
Turning our attention to the comparison between the US and the EU, the same model is run 
separately for US companies and European firms (608 vs. 504 companies). As can be seen in Table 
4, our results fully confirm the previous outcomes from the extant literature. Although uniformly 
positive and statistically significant, the R&D coefficients for the US firms turn out to be consistently 
larger than the corresponding coefficients for the European firms. Indeed, the two estimation 
techniques consistently provide European elasticities which are merely about 35% of their US 
counterparts (see the last column of Table 4). Focusing on the fixed-effects (FE) specification, the 
US/EU gap is statistically significant at the 99%-level, as reported in the last but one column of Table 
4 where a t-test measures whether the FE coefficients referred to the two areas are significantly 
different. We interpret these unambiguous results as a first support for H3 (stating a better ability of 
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US firms to translate R&D investments into productivity gains) and as a signal of the presence of a 
structural gap that European firms and European policy have to deal with. 
As far as the productivity impact of the physical capital stock is concerned, POLS and FE 
estimates tell a different story: they both show that EU has a relative (although only marginally 
significant) advantage in productivity from investing in physical capital. In particular, the FE 
elasticity for the EU is 30% higher than its US counterpart. This evidence suggests that in 2004-2012, 
European companies have mainly relied on embodied technological change in order to foster their 
levels of productivity.  
Finally, it is worth highlighting that FE estimates reveal a negative correlation between 
employment and productivity18. This is simply an evidence of decreasing returns to scale, which is 
not uncommon in fixed effects estimation of productivity equations. Interestingly, this is more 
accentuated for European than for US companies, given that the coefficient associated with the 
number of employees is more than 2.5 time larger for EU firms; this outcome can be related to the 
larger size of EU firms in our sample (see Table 3).  
Coming back to or main focus of interest, it is important to stress that the revealed transatlantic 
gap in the R&D/productivity elasticity is actually consistent with all the three interpretations put 
forward by the previous literature and discussed in Section 2.  
Firstly, the possibility of “threshold” effects in the effectiveness of R&D investment may 
suggest that large R&D expenditures are necessary to get the best in terms of productivity gains. This 
means that the average lower level of the R&D stock in the EU firms (see Table 3) can be seen as one 
of the culprits of the revealed weaker impact of R&D on productivity levels in Europe.  
Secondly, as detailed in Table 2, our regional subsamples (in so reflecting the actual structural 
compositions of the US and EU economies) are different as far as the incidence of the high-tech 
industries is concerned. If we take into account the previous evidence discussed in Section 2 
(revealing a greater impact of R&D investment on productivity in the high-tech industries rather than 
in the medium- and low-tech ones), our results turn out to be consistent with the structural 
composition effect discussed in Sections 1 and 2. Moreover, Table 4 reveals that the Wald test for 
equality of the industry dummies is always soundly rejected, supporting the idea that productivity 
differs across industries, even controlling for firms’ input choices. In other words, the US advantage 
in terms of R&D impact may be mainly due to an industry composition effect: in the aggregate, US 
                                                 
18 Opposite results turn out from the POLS estimates, but this is not surprising, since failing to control for unobserved 
firm heterogeneity tends to lead to overestimated labor and capital coefficients, due to their correlation with firm size, 
and in turn with the error term (Griliches and Mairesse, 1995). 
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firms may exhibit higher R&D/productivity elasticities just because they are relatively more 
concentrated in the high-tech industries where the returns to R&D are higher.  
Thirdly, results from Table 4 can be seen as suggestive of the presence of a relevant intrinsic 
effect (see Sections 1 and 2), that is an intrinsic disadvantage of European firms in translating R&D 
investment into productivity gains even within each industry, including the high-tech ones (see the 
qualification of our hypothesis H3). 
As an attempt to further disentangle the structural and the intrinsic effects, we can look again 
at Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 displays the US/EU comparison with regard to the high-tech macro sector: 
as can be seen, the European lag is fully confirmed. As it was the case for the whole economy (see 
Table 4), in the high-tech macro sector the US coefficients are larger than their European counterparts 
(0.333 vs 0.128). Moreover, focusing on the FE estimates, the R&D gap turns out to be statistically 
significant at the 99% level of confidence (t-test in the last but one column)19. This evidence suggests 
that the advantage of US companies in translating knowledge into productivity gains is not only 
driven by their higher concentration in high-tech industries, but also by their higher ability to translate 
R&D into productivity within those industries; therefore, the qualification of H3 receives a clear 
support from this evidence. 
 However, while the outcome from Table 5 rebalances our interpretation in favor of the 
intrinsic effect, it does not rule out the role of the structural composition effect completely. In fact, as 
it is obvious from Table 2, even the industry compositions within the high-tech macro sector remain 
different between the investigated US vs EU subsamples (for instance, ICT industries are over-
represented in the US subsample)20. Unfortunately, as already mentioned, paucity of observations 
does not allow us to proceed in a more detailed investigation at the single industry level. 
Turning our attention to the medium- and low-tech macro sector, European companies again 
show (both in the POLS and FE estimates) a lower elasticity of productivity to R&D in comparison 
with their US counterparts. However, this differential is smaller than in the case of the high-tech 
macro sector: looking at the FE coefficients, the European one it is about two-thirds (0.65) the one 
estimated for US firms (while in the case of high-tech it was about two-fifths, 0.38) and only 
significant at the 95% level. On the other hand, European companies in the medium- and low-tech 
macro sector seem to be more efficient in transforming investment in physical capital into 
productivity gains, although the t-test provides only marginal support of a statistical significant 
                                                 
19 Differently, the gap in the productivity impact of physical capital stock in favor of the European firms is not confirmed 
at all. 
20  The fact that the industry dummies keep on being jointly significant within the high-tech subsamples (see the 
corresponding Wald tests in the POLS estimates in Table 5) gives further support to the possibility of an important residual 
role of the structural composition effect. 
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difference. On the whole, the finding that US companies are more effective in translating their R&D 
investments into productivity gains both in the high-tech macro sector and in the medium- and low-
tech macro sector can be seen as a further support for the intrinsic effect (H3). 
In order to test our hypothesis H4, we re-ran the previous aggregate estimates, splitting the 
time-period into a pre-crisis sub-period from 2004 to 2008, and a post-crisis sub-period, from 2009-
2012. As can be seen in the next Tables 7 and 8 our data allow us to have adequate and comparable 
sub-samples to be used for this empirical test21.  
 
< INSERT TABLES 7 AND 8 > 
 
Results - comparing the whole sample evidence from the FE in the first panel of the two tables 
- reveal that in the post-crisis period the world top-R&D spenders had a lower capacity to translate 
investment in R&D into productivity gains (0.158 vs 0.243); while showing a slightly better 
performance in terms of getting productivity improvements from physical capital (0.089 vs 0.070). 
This result may suggest that firm R&D investment is less pro-cyclical than output, so in times of 
crisis output may suffer from higher volatility than R&D.  
Focusing on the comparison between the EU and the US, the evidence that US companies 
outperform the EU ones in terms of productivity gains from R&D capital persists before and after the 
crisis, (the t-tests supports at the 95% level of significance the difference among the two coefficients 
both in 2004-2008 and in 2009-2012). In particular, the gap is still clear in the post-crisis period, even 
if for both the US and the EU the magnitude of the elasticity lowers (from 0.294 to 0.199 for the US 
and from 0.194 to 0.093 for the EU). However, the EU companies have been more affected than their 
US counterparts in their capacity to translate R&D investments into productivity: -52% vs. -32%. 
This has implied that after the crisis the return from R&D investments of EU firms has dropped to 
46% of the return of US firms, compared with 66% before the crisis. Indeed, the US/EU efficiency 
gap in linking R&D and productivity has worsened as a consequence of the global economic crisis. 
In other words, this evidence not only supports our H4, but also points out a further deterioration of 
the transatlantic gap. 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
                                                 
21 On the contrary, running estimates that jointly apply the time splitting and the industry-level splitting is prevented by 
the scarce number of observations in each of the resulting subsamples. 
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In this paper, we have tested several hypotheses, based on the extant theoretical and empirical 
literature (see Section 2). In particular, we have tested our key hypothesis H3 that the transatlantic 
productivity gap may be due not only to a lower level of corporate R&D expenditures by European 
firms, but also to a possible lower capacity to translate corporate R&D expenditures into productivity 
gains.   
As a first step and consistently with the extant literature, we have found robust evidence of a 
positive and significant impact of the R&D stock on productivity (H1). However, the R&D 
coefficients for the US firms turn out to be consistently and significantly larger than the corresponding 
coefficients for the European firms: in the overall sample, European elasticities amount to about one 
third of their US counterparts. We interpret this unambiguous support of H3 as a clear evidence of 
the better ability of US firms in translating R&D investments into productivity gains and as a signal 
of a structural gap that European firms and European policy have to deal with. 
To see to what extent these transatlantic differences may be related to the different industrial 
structures in the US and the EU (the US economy being disproportionally characterized by high-tech 
industries), we have differentiated the US/EU comparative empirical exercise by macro-sectors, 
according to their technological level. Beyond confirming that the elasticity of productivity to the 
R&D stock is higher in the high-tech macro sector rather than in the medium- and low-tech macro 
sector (while the opposite occurs for the physical capital stock, so supporting H2a and H2b), our 
results also show that the US firms are more capable to translate their R&D investments into 
productivity gains both in the high-tech and in the medium- and low-tech macro sectors, with the US 
lead turning out particularly obvious in the former. Therefore, not only US firms are more 
concentrated in high-tech industries, contributing to a positive structural effect on aggregate 
productivity, but in those industries they can extract higher productivity gains from their R&D 
investments (this supports our qualification of the hypothesis H3).  
In summary, our results suggest that the transatlantic productivity divide can be explained by  a) 
a lower level of R&D investment of EU firms as opposed to their US counterparts (see Table 3), if 
we assume the presence of threshold barriers; b) a structural composition effect, which seems to be 
significant both in aggregate and even within the high-tech macro sector (see Tables 4 and 5 and the 
interpretations put forward in the previous section); and  c) the presence of an intrinsic effect, that is 
a generalized lower capacity of European firms to translate R&D investments into productivity gains.  
Furthermore, our results show that EU companies have been more affected by the economic crisis 
in their capacity to translate R&D investments into productivity: indeed, the US/EU gap investigated 
in this study has worsened as a consequence of the global economic crisis (H4). 
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These findings have a considerable impact for the organization of policy support. In fact, a major 
implication of the decreasing ability of EU firms to translate R&D into productivity after the crisis 
suggests that EU support for R&D has not proven to be particularly effective in reaching one of its 
major goals, i.e. turning the EU into a more competitive economy in the long-run. Rather the opposite 
seems to have occurred and this can be due to a myopic EU policy.  
Indeed, we find robust evidence of both a quantity effect (relatively lower R&D spending of 
European firms) and a quality effect (lower ability to transform R&D spending into productivity 
gains). However, most policy attention has been devoted to the lower levels of R&D spending rather 
than the lower capabilities to make efficient use of it. This is exemplified by the 3% target  (in terms 
of the R&D/GDP ratio) set by the EU, making reference primarily to increasing the level of R&D 
spending. Differently, effective policies should, instead of primarily focusing on the symptom (i.e. 
R&D investments that are perceived as too low), rather take into account the reasons why EU firms 
obtain less productivity gains from their R&D investments compared to their US counterparts. 
In this framework, a renewed EU industrial policy is surely needed: since the structural 
composition effect seems to still play an important role both in general and even within the high-tech 
macro sector, there is scope for an intervention addressed to twist the EU economy towards the 
emerging industries where R&D expenditures are more likely to foster productivity.  
In addition, our results regarding the intrinsic effect call for policies addressed to increase firm’s 
capabilities to turn R&D inputs into productivity gains rather than just increasing business R&D 
spending, irrespective of whether it pays off or not. One possible option is to make policies more 
learning-oriented by including fostering knowledge-transfer, learning between firms and R&D 
cooperation (see Frietsch et al., 2015; Tomasello et al., 2017; Toselli 2017; Rammer and Schubert, 
2018).  
Obviously enough, this paper leaves a series of open questions.  
Firstly, as discussed in the previous sections, paucity of observations does not allow us to proceed 
in a more detailed investigation at the single-industry level and in this way to better assess the relative 
importance of the structural composition effect vs the intrinsic effect.  
Secondly, in this contribution we could not directly test how important complementarities (such 
as those with human capital and managerial practices) may affect the firms’ ability to convert its R&D 
investment into productivity gains.  
Thirdly, globalization and offshoring may play a role in the ability to translate R&D into 
productivity, maybe in association with other characteristics of the firm; unfortunately, the lack of 
available information about the location of the different company’s activities prevented us from better 
investigating this issue.   
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Fourthly, although accounting for more than 90% of worldwide BERD, the adopted dataset is 
under-representing the SMEs, that may exhibit interesting peculiarities (particularly in the low-tech 
industries), worth to be investigated. 
Due to data constraints, these topics could not be addressed in this particular study, but they are 
certainly key issues for promising future avenues of research, based on more comprehensive datasets, 
also providing complementary information about skills, managerial capabilities, outsourcing and 
other key factors that may affect firm’s productivity. 
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Figure 1: GDP per hour worked (USD, 2010 PPP) in the period 2000-2014 
 
 
Source: OECD, 2015b 
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Table 1: Distribution of firms and observations across countries 
 
COUNTRY FIRMS % OBSERVATIONS % 
AUSTRIA 19 1.71 165 1.89 
BELGIUM 18 1.61 140 1.60 
DENMARK 22 1.98 176 2.01 
FINLAND 31 2.79 272 3.10 
FRANCE 79 7.10 642 7.33 
GERMANY 113 10.16 990 11.30 
GREECE 1 0.09 8 0.09 
HUNGARY 1 0.09 9 0.10 
IRELAND 10 0.90 82 0.94 
ITALY 19 1.71 109 1.24 
LUXEMBOURG 3 0.27 15 0.17 
MALTA 1 0.09 8 0.09 
SLOVENIA 1 0.09 9 0.10 
SPAIN 10 0.90 88 1.00 
SWEDEN 47 4.23 360 4.11 
THE NETHERLANDS 29 2.61 235 2.68 
UNITED KINGDOM 100 8.99 791 9.03 
EUROPEAN UNION 504 45.32 4,099 46.78 
UNITED STATES 608 54.68 4,664 53.22 
TOTAL 1,112 100.00 8,763 100.00 
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Table 2: Distribution of firms and observations across industries 
 
INDUSTRIES  
(ICB code) 
WHOLE  
SAMPLE 
EUROPEAN  
UNION 
UNITED  
STATES 
 FIRMS % OBS. % FIRMS % OBS. % FIRMS % OBS. % 
Oil & gas prod. (530) 5 0.45 24 0.27 4 0.79 23 0.56 1 0.17 2 0.04 
Oil equip. (570) 9 0.81 75 0.86 6 1.19 48 1.17 3 0.49 26 0.56 
Alternative energy (580) 4 0.36 34 0.39 3 0.60 27 0.66 1 0.17 7 0.15 
Chemicals (1350) 58 5.22 505 5.76 25 4.96 222 5.42 33 5.43 283 6.08 
Forestry & paper (1730) 8 0.72 69 0.79 6 1.19 51 1.24 2 0.33 18 0.39 
Ind.metals & min. (1750) 12 1.08 105 1.20 9 1.79 79 1.93 3 0.49 26 0.56 
Mining (1770) 6 0.54 34 0.39 4 0.79 17 0.41 2 0.33 17 0.36 
Construction & mater. (2350)  24 2.16 213 2.43 17 3.37 151 3.68 7 1.15 62 1.33 
Aerospace & defense (2710) 31 2.79 270 3.08 15 2.98 134 3.27 16 2.63 136 2.92 
General industrials (2720) 99 8.90 598 6.82 43 8.53 274 6.68 56 9.21 324 6.95 
Electronic & el.equip (2730) 91 8.18 748 8.54 44 8.73 378 9.22 47 7.73 370 7.93 
Industrial engine. (2750) 98 8.81 845 9.64 62 12.30 537 13.10 36 5.92 308 6.61 
Indust.transp.  (2770) 3 0.27 27 0.31 3 0.60 27 0.66 0 0 0 0 
Support services (2790) 14 1.26 122 1.39 11 2.18 97 2.37 3 0.49 25 0.54 
Automob. & parts (3350) 49 4.41 406 4.63 28 5.56 236 5.76 21 3.45 170 3.64 
Beverages (3530) 4 0.36 36 0.41 4 0.79 36 0.88 0 0 0 0 
Food producers (3570) 28 2.52 227 2.59 17 3.37 140 3.42 11 1.81 87 1.87 
House.goods & const. (3720) 19 1.71 169 1.93 8 1.59 72 1.76 11 1.81 97 2.08 
Leisure goods (3740) 15 1.35 128 1.46 5 0.99 43 1.05 10 1.64 85 1.82 
Personal goods (3760) 13 1.13 113 1.29 7 1.39 61 1.49 6 0.99 52 1.11 
Tobacco (3780) 3 0.27 23 0.26 2 0.40 18 0.44 1 0.17 5 0.11 
Health care equip. (4530) 66 5.94 539 6.16 18 3.57 156 3.81 48 7.89 383 8.21 
Pharma. & bio. (4570) 59 5.31 405 4.63 34 6.75 235 5.73 25 4.11 170 3.65 
General retailers (5370) 9 0.81 79 0.90 4 0.79 35 0.85 5 0.82 44 0.94 
Media (5550) 10 0.90 81 0.92 5 0.99 39 0.95 5 0.82 42 0.90 
Travel & leisure (5750) 8 0.73 62 0.71 4 0.79 33 0.81 4 0.66 29 0.62 
Fixed line telec. (6530) 11 0.99 88 1.00 8 1.59 64 1.56 3 0.49 24 0.51 
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Mobile telec. (6570) 3 0.27 26 0.30 2 0.40 18 0.44 1 0.17 8 0.17 
Electricity (7530) 5 0.45 27 0.31 5 0.99 27 0.66 0 0 0 0 
Gas, water & multi-ut. (7570) 5 0.45 35 0.40 5 0.99 35 0.85 0 0 0 0 
Financial serv. (8770) 8 0.72 59 0.67 3 0.60 21 0.51 5 0.82 38 0.81 
Equity inv.instrum. (8980) 1 0.09 9 0.10 0 0 0 0 1 0.17 9 0.19 
Software & comp.serv. (9530) 156 14.03 1,212 13.83 54 10.71 432 10.54 102 16.78 780 16.72 
Tech.hard & equip. (9570) 178 16.01 1,370 15.63 39 7.74 333 8.12 139 22.86 1,037 22.23 
 1,112 100.00 8,763 100.00 504 100.00 4,099 100.00 608 100.00 4,664 100.00 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Sample 
(N. of 
observations) 
Labor Productivity 
NS/E 
R&D stock per employee 
K/E 
Physical capital stock per employee 
C/E 
Employees 
E 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Whole 
sample 
(8,763) 
252.18 199.20 66.98 85.98 130.94 120.08 21,371.09 50,965.21 
US (4,664) 261.72 191.50 81.31 92.35 133.29 113.60 16,973.35 40,843.24 
EU (4,099) 241.32 207.10 50.68 74.86 128.27 127.01 26,375.02 60,070.24 
High-tech 
(5,583) 
248.21 184.22 82.75 88.49 122.02 108.57 17,069.86 43,928.71 
Medium- and 
low-tech 
(3,180) 
239.15 222.95 39.31 73.66 146.60 136.60 28,922.59 60,672.77 
 
Whole 
sample 
2004-2008 
(4,949) 
244.23 192.36 53.31 77.13 122.96 116.25 20,455.02 48,766.52 
US (2,652) 253.54 194.05 64.51 82.16 124.51 107.84 16,333.93 38,902.62 
EU (2,297) 233.49 189.88 40.39 68.65 121.17 125.26 25,213.03 57,753.02 
Whole 
sample 
2009-2012 
(3,814) 
262.49 207.30 84.72 93.34 141.30 124.12 22,559.77 53,667.32 
US (2,012) 272.51 187.59 103.46 100.06 144.86 119.81 17,816.15 43,263.81 
EU (1,802) 251.29 226.83 63.80 80.23 137.32 128.69 27,856.20 62,885.47 
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Table 4: Dependent variable: log(Labor Productivity); WHOLE SAMPLE 
  
WHOLE 
SAMPLE 
 
UNITED 
STATES 
EUROPEAN 
UNION 
WHOLE 
SAMPLE 
UNITED 
STATES 
EUROPEAN 
UNION 
 
EU –US^ 
 
 
EU/US 
 POLS POLS POLS FE FE FE FE FE 
Log(R&D stock 
per employee) 
0.148*** 
(0.007) 
0.234*** 
(0.010) 
0.083*** 
(0.012) 
0.178*** 
(0.013) 
0.267*** 
(0.019) 
0.094*** 
(0.018) 
-0.173***  
[0.000] 
0.35 
Log(Physical 
capital stock per 
employee)  
0.236*** 
(0.009) 
0.174*** 
(0.011) 
0.293*** 
(0.015) 
0.112*** 
(0.007) 
0.099*** 
(0.009) 
0.129*** 
(0.012) 
0.030*  
[0.060] 
1.30 
Log(Employees) 0.027*** 
(0.005) 
0.031*** 
(0.006) 
0.032*** 
(0.007) 
-0.143*** 
(0.012) 
-0.082*** 
(0.016) 
-0.223*** 
(0.019) 
-0.141***  
[0.000] 
2.71 
Constant 3.773*** 
(0.170) 
5.872*** 
(0.095) 
3.437*** 
(0.165) 
     
         
Wald time-
dummies  
(p-value) 
5.2*** 
(0.000) 
 
6.5*** 
(0.000) 
2.3** 
(0.017) 
21.8*** 
(0.000) 
 
15.3*** 
(0.000) 
11.9*** 
(0.000) 
  
Wald country-
dummies  
(p-value) 
13.5*** 
(0.000) 
 
 10.8*** 
(0.000) 
  
 
   
Wald industry- 
dummies  
(p-value) 
41.9*** 
(0.000) 
 
198.3*** 
(0.000) 
22.3*** 
(0.000) 
  
 
   
         
R2 (overall) 
R2 (within) 
0.35 
 
0.38 0.38  
0.20 
 
0.22 
 
0.19 
  
Obs. 8,763 4,664 4,099 8,763 4,664 4,099   
N. of firms 1,112 608 504 1,112 608 504   
Notes: (Robust in POLS) standard errors in brackets; * significance at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1 %.  
For time-dummies, country-dummies and  industry-dummies, Wald tests of joint significance are reported. 
^ The absolute difference between the EU and US coefficients (from the FE estimates) is reported, together with the p-value (in squared brackets) of the t-test on the significance 
of this difference. In the last column the ratio of the EU coefficient with respect to the US one is reported.  
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Table 5: Dependent variable: log(Labor Productivity); HIGH-TECH MACRO SECTOR 
  
WHOLE 
SAMPLE 
 
 
UNITED 
STATES 
 
EUROPEAN 
UNION 
 
WHOLE 
SAMPLE 
 
UNITED 
STATES 
 
EUROPEAN 
UNION 
 
EU-US^ 
 
EU/US 
 POLS POLS POLS FE FE FE FE FE 
Log(R&D stock per 
employee) 
0.229*** 
(0.010) 
0.277*** 
(0.011) 
0.154*** 
(0.020) 
0.255*** 
(0.016) 
0.333*** 
(0.019) 
0.128*** 
(0.026) 
-0.205***  
[0.000] 
0.38 
Log(Physical 
capital stock per 
employee)  
0.181*** 
(0.009) 
0.153*** 
(0.012) 
0.219*** 
(0.017) 
0.082*** 
(0.007) 
0.088*** 
(0.009) 
0.062*** 
(0.015) 
-0.026  
[0.129] 
0.70 
Log(Employees) 0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
-0.142*** 
(0.014) 
-0.096*** 
(0.017) 
-0.243*** 
(0.024) 
-0.147***  
[0.000] 
2.53 
Constant 4.298*** 
(0.916) 
3.914*** 
(0.098) 
3.988*** 
(0.130) 
     
         
Wald time-
dummies  
(p-value) 
11.5*** 
(0.000) 
 
12.2*** 
(0.000) 
2.5*** 
(0.000) 
23.6*** 
(0.000) 
 
20.1*** 
(0.000) 
7.7*** 
(0.000) 
  
Wald country-
dummies  
(p-value) 
24.7*** 
(0.000) 
 
 21.7*** 
(0.000) 
  
 
   
Wald industry-
dummies  
(p-value) 
100.5*** 
(0.000) 
 
99.3*** 
(0.000) 
31.0*** 
(0.000) 
  
 
   
         
R2 (overall) 
R2 (within) 
0.39 
 
0.41 0.37  
0.24 
 
0.22 
 
0.22 
  
Obs. 5,583 3,414 2,169 5,583 3,414 2,169   
N. of firms 703 441 262 703 441 262   
Notes: (Robust in POLS) standard errors in brackets; * significance at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1 %. 
For time-dummies, country-dummies and industry-dummies, Wald tests of joint significance are reported. 
^ The absolute difference between the EU and US coefficients (from the FE estimates) is reported, together with the p-value (in squared brackets) of the t-test on the significance 
of this difference. In the last column the ratio of the EU coefficient with respect to the US one is reported.  
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Table 6: Dependent variable: log(Labor Productivity); MEDIUM- AND LOW-TECH MACRO SECTOR 
  
WHOLE 
SAMPLE 
 
 
UNITED 
STATES 
 
EUROPEAN 
UNION 
 
WHOLE 
SAMPLE 
 
UNITED 
STATES 
 
EUROPEAN 
UNION 
 
EU-US^ 
 
EU/US 
 POLS POLS POLS FE FE FE FE FE 
Log(R&D stock per 
employee) 
0.054*** 
(0.012) 
0.144*** 
(0.021) 
0.027* 
(0.016) 
0.100*** 
(0.021) 
0.133*** 
(0.041) 
0.087*** 
(0.025) 
-0.046**  
[0.019] 
0.65 
Log(Physical 
capital stock per 
employee)  
0.331*** 
(0.019) 
0.222*** 
(0.025) 
0.395*** 
(0.026) 
0.195*** 
(0.016) 
0.162*** 
(0.025) 
0.214*** 
(0.021) 
0.052*  
[0.100] 
1.32 
Log(Employees) 0.013 
(0.010) 
0.037*** 
(0.012) 
0.032*** 
(0.007) 
-0.097*** 
(0.023) 
-0.002 
(0.038) 
-0.173*** 
(0.029) 
-
0.171*** 
[0.000] 
86.5 
Constant 3.424*** 
(0.201) 
3.684*** 
(0.361) 
3.544*** 
(0.284) 
  
 
   
         
Wald time-
dummies  
(p-value) 
2.8*** 
(0.000) 
 
1.4 
(0.174) 
1.7* 
(0.087) 
7.8*** 
(0.000) 
 
2.7*** 
(0.006) 
7.0*** 
(0.000) 
  
Wald country-
dummies  
(p-value) 
6.9*** 
(0.000) 
 
 5.5*** 
(0.000) 
  
 
   
Wald industry-
dummies  
(p-value) 
20.9*** 
(0.000) 
 
74.1*** 
(0.000) 
20.4*** 
(0.000) 
  
 
   
         
R2 (overall) 
R2 (within) 
0.42 
 
0.38 0.49  
0.18 
 
0.21 
 
0.19 
  
Obs. 3,180 1,250 1,930 3,180 1,250 1,930   
N. of firms 409 167 242 409 167 242   
Notes: (Robust in POLS) standard errors in brackets; * significance at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1 %. 
For time-dummies, country-dummies and industry-dummies, Wald tests of joint significance are reported. 
^ The absolute difference between the EU and US coefficients (from the FE estimates) is reported, together with the p-value (in squared brackets) of the t-test on the significance 
of this difference. In the last column the ratio of the EU coefficient with respect to the US one is reported.
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Table 7: Dependent variable: log(Labor Productivity); 2004-2008 
  
WHOLE 
SAMPLE 
 
 
UNITED 
STATES 
 
EUROPEAN 
UNION 
 
WHOLE 
SAMPLE 
 
UNITED 
STATES 
 
EUROPEAN 
UNION 
 
EU-US^ 
 
EU/US 
 POLS POLS POLS FE FE FE FE FE 
Log(R&D stock per 
employee) 
0.143*** 
(0.010) 
0.224*** 
(0.014) 
0.074** 
(0.023) 
0.243*** 
(0.022) 
0.294*** 
(0.032) 
0.194*** 
(0.030) 
-0.100**  
[0.028] 
0.66 
Log(Physical 
capital stock per 
employee)  
0.216*** 
(0.012) 
0.161*** 
(0.016) 
0.265*** 
(0.039) 
0.070*** 
(0.011) 
0.087*** 
(0.012) 
0.034* 
(0.018) 
-0.053** 
[0.021] 
0.39 
Log(Employees) 0.036*** 
(0.007) 
0.046*** 
(0.009) 
0.036*** 
(0.018) 
-0.136*** 
(0.020) 
-0.133*** 
(0.029) 
-0.131*** 
(0.031) 
0.002  
[0.960] 
0.98 
Constant 3.565*** 
(0.126) 
3.647*** 
(0.169) 
3.235*** 
(0.238) 
     
         
Wald time-
dummies  
(p-value) 
0.6 
(0.665) 
 
2.7** 
(0.028) 
0.5 
(0.750) 
1.5 
(0.195) 
8.8*** 
(0.000) 
1.5 
(0.195) 
  
Wald country-
dummies  
(p-value) 
11.2*** 
(0.000) 
 
 8.5*** 
(0.000) 
  
 
   
Wald industry-
dummies  
(p-value) 
26.5*** 
(0.000) 
 
27.5*** 
(0.000) 
17.0*** 
(0.000) 
  
 
   
         
R2 (overall) 
R2 (within) 
0.33 
 
0.59 0.43  
0.18 
 
0.22 
 
0.16 
  
Obs. 4,949 2,652 2,297 4,949 2,652 2,297   
N. of firms 1,090 588 502 1,090 588 502   
Notes: (Robust in POLS) standard errors in brackets; * significance at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1 %. 
For time-dummies, country-dummies and industry-dummies, Wald tests of joint significance are reported. 
^ The absolute difference between the EU and US coefficients (from the FE estimates) is reported, together with the p-value (in squared brackets) of the t-test on the significance 
of this difference. In the last column the ratio of the EU coefficient with respect to the US one is reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
Table 8: Dependent variable: log(Labor Productivity); 2009-2012 
  
WHOLE 
SAMPLE 
 
UNITED 
STATES 
 
EUROPEAN
UNION 
 
WHOLE 
SAMPLE 
 
UNITED 
STATES 
 
EUROPEAN 
UNION 
 
EU-US^ 
 
EU/US 
 POLS POLS POLS FE FE FE FE FE 
Log(R&D stock per 
employee) 
0.164*** 
(0.011) 
0.261*** 
(0.011) 
0.096*** 
(0.018) 
0.158*** 
(0.026) 
0.199*** 
(0.034) 
0.093** 
(0.041) 
-0.106**  
[0.049] 
0.46 
Log(Physical 
capital stock per 
employee)  
0.258*** 
(0.013) 
0.191*** 
(0.012) 
0.323*** 
(0.024) 
0.089*** 
(0.010) 
0.105*** 
(0.013) 
0.058*** 
(0.018) 
-0.047**  
[0.037] 
0.55 
Log(Employees) 0.006 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.020* 
(0.011) 
-0.248*** 
(0.027) 
-
0.319*** 
(0.034) 
-0.264*** 
(0.045) 
0.055  
[0.327] 
0.82 
Constant 2.868*** 
(0.095) 
2.699*** 
(0.105) 
3.605*** 
(0.265) 
     
         
Wald time-
dummies  
(p-value) 
5.8*** 
(0.665) 
 
3.2** 
(0.022) 
4.2*** 
(0.005) 
57.7*** 
(0.000) 
37.7*** 
(0.000) 
23.7*** 
(0.000) 
  
Wald country-
dummies  
(p-value) 
11.9*** 
(0.000) 
 
 7.9*** 
(0.000) 
     
Wald industry-
dummies  
(p-value) 
19.8*** 
(0.000) 
 
35.8*** 
(0.000) 
12.0*** 
(0.000) 
  
 
   
         
R2 (overall) 
R2 (within) 
0.42 
 
0.49 0.43  
0.26 
 
0.20 
 
0.20 
  
Obs. 3,814 2,012 1,802 3,814 2,012 1,802   
N. of firms 1,024 555 469 1,024 555 469   
Notes: (Robust in POLS) standard errors in brackets; * significance at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1 %. 
For time-dummies, country-dummies and industry-dummies, Wald tests of joint significance are reported. 
^ The absolute difference between the EU and US coefficients (from the FE estimates) is reported, together with the p-value (in squared brackets) of the t-test on the significance 
of this difference. In the last column the ratio of the EU coefficient with respect to the US one is reported. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1: Classification of ICB industries into the HIGH-TECH and MEDIUM-  AND   LOW-
TECH macro sectors 
 
INDUSTRIES 
(ICB code) 
R&D/Employees 
(th. € per employee) 
Classification 
Pharma, & bio, (4570) 66.08 High-Tech 
Tech,hard & equip, (9570) 44.16 High-Tech 
Software & comp,serv, (9530) 27.66 High-Tech 
Leisure goods (3740) 20.49 High-Tech 
Health care equip, (4530) 16.12 High-Tech 
Electronic & el,equip (2730) 12.99 High-Tech 
Aerospace & defense (2710) 9.87 High-Tech 
Automob, & parts (3350) 9.74 High-Tech 
Chemicals (1350) 9.52 High-Tech 
General retailers (5370) 9.39 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Financial serv, (8770) 9.03 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Mobile telec, (6570) 9.01 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Media (5550) 8.94 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Alternative energy (580) 7.44 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Fixed line telec, (6530) 7.38 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Industrial engine, (2750) 6.85 Medium- and Low-Tech 
House,goods & const, (3720) 5.53 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Travel & leisure (5750) 5.26 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Personal goods (3760) 4.41 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Equity inv,instrum, (8980) 4.28 Medium- and Low-Tech 
General industrials (2720) 4.27 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Support services (2790) 4.26 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Oil equip, (570) 4.23 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Ind,metals & min, (1750) 3.47 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Oil & gas prod, (530) 3.38 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Food producers (3570) 3.01 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Electricity (7530) 2.15 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Gas, water & multi-ut, (7570) 2.10 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Construction & mater, (2350)  1.99 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Tobacco (3780) 1.92 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Forestry & paper (1730) 1.83 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Indust,transp,  (2770) 1.23 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Beverages (3530) 1.20 Medium- and Low-Tech 
Mining (1770) 1.15 Medium- and Low-Tech 
 
 
 
 
 
 
